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This paper reports findings from a study designed to
gain broader understanding of sensemaking activities
using the Data/Frame Theory as the analytical frame-
work. Although this theory is one of the dominant
models of sensemaking, it has not been extensively
tested with a range of sensemaking tasks. The tasks
discussed here focused on making sense of structures
rather than processes or narratives. Eleven researchers
were asked to construct understanding of how a scien-
tific community in a particular domain is organized (e.g.,
people, relationships, contributions, factors) by explor-
ing the concept of “influence” in academia. This topic
was chosen because, although researchers frequently
handle this type of task, it is unlikely that they have
explicitly sought this type of information. We conducted
a think-aloud study and semistructured interviews with
junior and senior researchers from the human–
computer interaction (HCI) domain, asking them to iden-
tify current leaders and rising stars in both HCI and
chemistry. Data were coded and analyzed using the
Data/Frame Model to both test and extend the model.
Three themes emerged from the analysis: novices and
experts’ sensemaking activity chains, constructing
frames through indicators, and characteristics of struc-
ture tasks. We propose extensions to the Data/Frame
Model to accommodate structure sensemaking.
Introduction
Exploring sensemaking, i.e., how people make sense of
problems, sheds light on the development of a repertoire of
skills to deal with novel situations. As Bates (2010) puts it:
“People—even including Ph.D. scholars—develop what
search skills they have incidentally to their primary efforts at
research or problem-solving, and often fail to develop a
conscious repertoire of search skills and techniques to help
them over difficult stages.” Our aim in the work reported
here was to test one of the prominent models of
sensemaking—Klein et al.’s (2007) data/frame (D/F)
model—by applying it to a kind of sensemaking task to
which it has not previously been applied (as described
below) in order to test its generalizability.
The process of sensemaking involves cycles and activi-
ties that have been reported in prior studies on sensemaking
models and theories. Studies by Russell, Stefik, Pirolli, and
Card (1993), Dervin (1999), Pirolli and Card (2005), and
Klein et al. (2007) have been widely used to explain how
people interact with information and make sense of a
problem situation. These studies present a theoretical expla-
nation of the processes people go through to understand
narratives or processes. For example, intelligence analysts
may explain a variety of phenomena by reconstructing
sequences of events and their causal relationships (Pirolli &
Card, 2005).
The motivation for this study was to learn how novice and
experienced researchers make sense and construct an under-
standing of their academic communities to better support
those processes. Not all sensemaking tasks involve unravel-
ing a narrative: They can also involve understanding a struc-
ture (i.e., structure sensemaking). Existing models of
sensemaking have not been widely tested with different
types of tasks. Within the sensemaking literature, this con-
stitutes an area for further exploration—an area to which this
paper contributes.
The study reported here presents behaviors in an aca-
demic context when solving four challenging sensemaking
tasks concerned with constructing an understanding of how
a particular academic community is organized: which are
the main components and parts (e.g., people, contributions,
sources), how these components and parts are interrelated,
and what the structure is. This extends previous work
reported by Pontis and Blandford (in press), which focused
on the roles of professional and domain expertise in
shaping people’s sensemaking processes. In that earlier
work, Klein et al.’s (2007) D/F model was used as a
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sensitizing framework, but was not the focus of analysis. In
the work reported here, the focus of analysis is specifically
on the D/F model and on the extent to which it accounts for
the data. Our intention was to test how well the model
generalizes to structure tasks, having originally been devel-
oped for narrative tasks. The D/F model has been previously
used in information science contexts to exemplify the itera-
tive process involved in information seeking (Jansen &
Rieh, 2010), to describe the complex cognitive activities
involved in information processing through visual represen-
tations (Parsons & Sedig, 2014), and to understand “the
cognitive process and mechanisms of . . . sensemaking”
(Zhang & Soergel, 2014, p. 1733).
Although Klein et al.’s (2007) D/F model is one of the
dominant models of sensemaking, it has not been tested with
sensemaking tasks that involve making sense of structures or
organizations. In this paper, we code and analyze cases
looking for evidence supporting the idea of frames, and
other key components of the model, but also for cases that
indicate contradictions or further details that did not feature
in the original model. Saturation was achieved after four
cases (16 tasks).
The aim of this study was to test whether the D/F model
could be used to understand nonnarrative sensemaking
tasks. Outcomes from applying the D/F model in structure
sensemaking tasks may allow the development of better-
informed tools or systems to support such sensemaking, and
contribute to science research by presenting aspects
involved in the sensemaking of structure tasks. In addition to
providing a set of recommendations to expand or embellish
the theory to describe activities of broader types of sense-
making tasks, our study contributes to information behavior
research by exploring how a specific population that fre-
quently deals with structure sensemaking tasks (i.e., aca-
demics) interacts with information and constructs an
understanding to solve those tasks. Findings can be applied
to better understand the “interaction between people and
content in information systems” (Jansen & Rieh, 2010)
expanding the information seeking and information retrieval
literature.
Related Work
Sensemaking involves knowledge construction from
information and gaining understanding of a problem-
situation. The process has been studied in various disciplines
including information science (e.g., Dervin, 1999), human–
computer interaction (HCI) (e.g., Pirolli & Card, 2005;
Russell et al., 1993), organizational studies (e.g., Weick,
1995), and organizational behaviors and information domi-
nance (e.g., Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006). Sensemaking
starts when a person realizes the ambiguity or inadequacy of
their current understanding of a situation or when they want
to expand their understanding of what is going on in a
situation. They then make a “deliberate effort” to seek new
information to construct a broader or new understanding
(Klein et al., 2007), or to combine their understanding with
the understanding of others (Dervin, 1999). People examine
the environment (reality, situations, events) by interacting
with a small amount of the information they encounter. This
is an active interaction that involves discovering connections
among data (e.g., people, places, events) and giving meaning
to experiences. Through the process of sensemaking, people
“integrate what is known and what is conjectured, to connect
what is observed with what is inferred” (Klein et al., 2007,
p. 114). Sensemaking can be used for a varied range of
situations from problem detection, connecting dots and
forming explanations to projecting future states, and identi-
fying problems; people follow various strategies to gain
knowledge, draw inferences, and make predictions from
data.
Although existing models of sensemaking have common-
alities (e.g., they describe similar steps, actions and phases
involving information seeking and gathering, and informa-
tion retrieval and interaction), they have been developed
from different perspectives. For example, Russell et al.
(1993) approach sensemaking as “a process of modeling”
while Dervin’s (1999) theory sees it as “a process of educa-
tion” (Kolko, 2010).
These differences in perspective can be illustrated by
comparing Dervin’s theory of sense-making (1999), which
originated in the contexts of information science, informa-
tion needs, and use, with Klein’s theory of sensemaking
(1997), which is the analytical theory we use in this study.
Table 1 compares the core aspects of both theories.
Dervin uses the term sense-making and Klein uses the
term sensemaking to refer to their respective theories. In this
paper, we use the former spelling when we refer to Dervin’s
theory and the latter spelling when referring to Klein’s
theory. Klein’s D/F model has been introduced to express
“the core process of sensemaking as it occurs in high-end,
proficient problem solving” (Moore & Hoffman, 2011, p.
145), whereas Dervin’s presents “a theoretic net, a set of
assumptions and propositions, and a set of methods that
have been developed to study the making of sense that
people do in their everyday experiences” (Savolainen, 2006,
p. 1117). Although using different terminologies, both theo-
ries discuss the construction of new knowledge to solve a
TABLE 1. Comparison of the core aspects of Dervin’s and Klein’s
theories of sensemaking.
Dervin’s theory of sense-making
(1999)
Klein’s D/F theory of sensemaking
(1997)
Space-time situations Evolving situations
Stop or barrier to movement (gap) Inadequacy of current understanding
Bridge (thoughts, ideas, feelings,
intuitions, answers)
Data (incoming information)
Verbings (ways in which people
make use of bridges, guide the
construction of the bridge)
Frames (explanatory structures that
connects data, determine the need
for more data)
Gap-bridging tactics and strategies
(determine ways to construct the
bridge)
Cognitive activities (change and
adapt the frame as new
data/information is found)
2 JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—•• 2015
DOI: 10.1002/asi
problem (Klein, 1997) or fill a gap (Dervin, 1999), while
using frames (Klein, 1997) or verbings (Dervin, 1999) to
guide the processes of information seeking and use.
Dervin’s theory of sense-making is based on “gap-
bridging,” which begins when an individual faces a prob-
lematic situation (“gap-facing”) (Savolainen, 1993, p. 17).
The theory is built on “the metaphorical triangle of
situation–gap–uses in that gap-bridging stands for the
process which results in various outcomes of information
seeking and use” (Savolainen, 2006, p. 1117). People “con-
struct bridges” (find answers) to fill the gap of knowledge/
information; “the attempts to bridge [the] gap are preceded
by gap-facing and gap-defining, followed by the consider-
ation of gap-bridging strategies and tactics” (Savolainen,
2006, p. 1120). “The construction of the ‘informational’
bridge consists of identifying, finding, and combining
various elements such as ideas, beliefs, and narratives”
(Savolainen, 2006, p. 1121). As in Klein’s (1997) theory,
Dervin argues that people use prior experiences (internal
sources) to anticipate possible outcomes of gap-bridging,
but when they cannot rely on their knowledge they look for
external familiar sources until they find the information that
helps them fill the gap. Although the frame is changed and
adapted through cognitive activities in the D/F theory, gap-
bridging strategies and tactics are used to determine ways to
construct the most appropriate bridge in the sense-making
theory. A difference between both theories is that the “nature
of these strategies and tactics is not discussed in greater
detail in sense-making” (Savolainen, 2006, p. 1122),
whereas in Klein et al.’s theory (2007) cognitive activities
that people follow to make sense of a situation are explained
in detail.
In this study, we analyze the D/F model because it con-
siders sensemaking as a process of problem-solving based
on sensemakers’ experiences and interpretations, and
because it provides a clear explanation of common activities
involved in the process. In the next sections we describe in
more detail the D/F Theory of sensemaking, and discuss
other relevant theories for this study.
Frames as Explanatory Structures of Sensemaking
Klein (1997) introduced the D/F theory of sensemaking
(Figure 1) which is derived from his work on a naturalistic
decision-making framework for understanding military
decision-making. This theory contemplates the creation of
internal, cognitive representations when people are making
sense of a situation. Building on Minsky’s work (1977),
Klein et al. (2007) argue that elements are explained when
they are fitted into a structure that links them to other ele-
ments. Minsky (1977, p. 355) explained that when we are
making sense of a situation we “select from memory a
structure” of information. Memory is the place where we
store our repertoire of frames. Both theories use the term
“frame” to refer to the data-structure (Minsky, 1977) or
explanatory structure (Klein et al., 2007) that defines entities
and describes their relationship with other entities. A frame
can take the form of: a story (explaining a chronology of
events), a map (explaining location, showing distances and
directions), a script (explaining roles), or a plan (describing
a sequence of intended actions) (Klein et al., 2007). Sharing
a similar view of explanatory structures, Russell et al.
(1993) see those representations as external constructions,
referred to as schemas, rather than internal representations.
When making sense of a task, we need a structure (e.g.,
frame) to direct the search for ways to gain new understand-
ing, for example, seeking information (Pirolli & Card, 2005;
Russell et al., 1993). These structures define and give
meaning to the elements of a situation, and guide sensemak-
ers in the process of filtering (relevant from irrelevant) and
interpreting data. Various studies have analyzed the selec-
tion or identification of that initial structure (e.g., Minsky,
1977; Bodnar, 2005; Klein et al., 2007; Russell et al., 1993;
Pirolli & Card, 2005). Whereas Minsky (1977) argued that
the situation determines the selection of one frame or
another, Klein et al. (2007, p. 118) stated that “the data
identify the relevant frame, and the frame determines which
data are noticed.” Klein et al. added that “neither of these
[frame or data] comes first” as the “data elicit and help to
construct the frame and the frame defines, connects and
filters the data” (2007, p. 118). Both authors argue that that
structure (frame or schema) explains the data and guides the
search for more data, reflecting the sensemaker’s accumu-
lated experiences. Similarly, Attfield and Blandford (2011)
describe internal and external representations (explanatory
structures) as a consequence of possessing an understanding
of the task domain and going through a “bottom-up and
top-down” sensemaking interaction. Even if the initial frame
FIG. 1. Data/frame model of sensemaking based on Klein et al. (2007)
and Moore and Hoffman (2011).
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is poor or mistaken, it guides the search for data until new
information helps to identify initial errors and redirect the
search.
During the sensemaking process, the initial selected
frame adapts as we encounter more information. Klein et al.
(2007, p. 118) describe the frame as an active structure that
evolves as new information becomes available, and that can
be “improve[d] or replace[d] (. . .) to obtain more relevant
data” through cognitive sensemaking activities. This paper
explores academics’ sensemaking activities to identify,
select, and use frames to make sense of the structures of both
familiar and unfamiliar domains, and gain an understanding
of influence. As in previous studies (Klein et al., 2007; Sieck
et al., 2007), we investigate the relationship between the
selection of frames and domain expertise.
Cognitive Sensemaking Activities
Broadly, sensemaking activities relate to organizing,
collecting, and accessing information to construct the nec-
essary understanding. More specifically, sensemaking
involves “learning about new domains, solving ill-
structured problems, acquiring situation awareness, and
participating in social exchanges of knowledge” (Pirolli &
Russell, 2011, p. 1). Originally, Klein et al. (2007, pp.
132–142) described seven cognitive activities involved in
the D/F model:
1. Mapping data and frame: This activity involves connect-
ing the data and a frame. The identification and selection
of frames is a conscious process, which depends on the
data and information that is available, and on the indi-
vidual’s aims, repertoire of frames, and attitude (e.g.,
commitment to a task).
2. Elaborating a frame: Initial frames are expanded until
anomalies become apparent giving an indication that the
frame needs to be replaced. Otherwise we explore the
initial frame, searching to add details and fill in slots.
3. Questioning a frame: If while working with the frame we
encounter data which are inconsistent with that frame, we
may decide that that frame needs to be replaced although
we may not be certain whether the frame is incorrect. All
we have found are inconsistencies that lead us to start
questioning the frame.
4. Preserving a frame: When inconsistencies previously
found are considered not relevant or strong enough to
dismiss the frame we have been working with, that frame
is preserved. A frame should not be preserved if indicators
of inaccuracy emerge during the exploration process.
5. Comparing frames: In some cases we consider more than
one frame at the same time. Then we compare those
frames to fully appreciate the dimension of the task. Klein
et al. (2007) report that three is the maximum number of
alternative frames we can work with at the same time but
do not provide an explanation of this.
6. Reframing: When we accumulate inconsistencies and
contradictory evidence, we need to replace the frame. In
other words, the structure we were using to guide our data
search needs to be changed as it was misleading. In some
cases, we consider data elements that we have previously
discarded for our frame, but that now we find relevant as
new cues emerge.
7. Constructing or finding a frame: When we encounter a
situation that does not make sense for us, or our initial
frame cannot be reframed, we seek and construct a new
frame.
According to the D/F model, the process of sensemaking
can start with any of these activities, as they do not corre-
spond to a specific order, that is, the order responds to
sensemakers’ needs. Klein et al. (2007) added that sense-
making can involve a few activities or all of them and that
each sensemaking activity involves actions that define and
update the frame and the data.
Narrative and Structure Sensemaking
Sensemaking tasks are often associated with the recon-
struction of events (e.g., incident analysis) or understanding
processes (e.g., how steps or actions occur). There is a
variety of sensemaking tasks corresponding to those char-
acteristics, as illustrated in the introduction to a special issue
on sensemaking (Pirolli & Russell, 2011, p. 2):
“Examples of sensemaking activities include understanding
features, costs, service plans, and trade-offs in consumer deci-
sion making (e.g., buying a cell phone); collecting, organizing,
and comprehending information about a medical condition,
treatment options, and trade-offs in order to choose a treatment
(Bhavnani, 2002; Bhavnani, Jacob, Nardine, & Peck, 2003);
analyzing a subject matter domain in order to develop an effi-
cient and effective training course (Russell et al., 1993); and
collecting and analyzing open source publications to determine
the likelihood that a foreign nation is developing biological
weapons (Pirolli & Card, 2005).”
When making sense of any of the above situations we
gain an understanding through searching for and finding
relevant information and constructing a chain of events to
build a story. The D/F model has been successfully applied
to represent the sensemaking process of developing situa-
tions in the intelligence analysis context (Moore &
Hoffman, 2011), in which multiple themes or storylines
were happening simultaneously, such as scenarios based on
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (Sieck et al., 2007), and
navigational problems, for example, how do I go from A to
B (Sieck et al., 2007). Also, it has been applied to under-
stand operative sensemaking in a medical context (Stewart,
Dominguez, & Lawrence, 2011), for studying problem
detection (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, & Woods, 2005) and inci-
dent analysis (Klein et al., 2007). These studies have
explored narrative tasks, and in some cases, real-time sen-
semaking (Wahlström, Karvonen, & Norros, 2013);
however, very few studies have investigated how individuals
make sense of structure tasks. Instead of investigating struc-
ture sensemaking with more traditional information-seeking
tasks, we explored it using influence tasks because they are
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intrinsic to the nature of academia and frequently dealt with
by academics. This paper investigates structure sensemaking
in experimental conditions, by studying how academics gain
an understanding of a scientific community structure.
Sensemaking structure tasks. Academics seek and make
sense of information in well-defined situations (e.g., looking
for a specific book) and ill-defined situations (e.g., looking
for any relevant information when starting a new project). In
the latter situations, people need to determine from where to
start the search (define the problem). In this study, we
explore situations dealing with the problem of “influence” as
an example of structure sensemaking. In academia, situa-
tions with a similar problem frequently occur at the begin-
ning of a PhD investigation, when recruiting researchers,
when assigning roles in a new project, or looking for key
authors when learning about a new project or preparing a
class on an unfamiliar topic. In all those situations, academ-
ics evaluate how influential other academics are, but most
likely they would go through this process without making it
explicit that they were seeking that characteristic.
Influence tasks are considered here structure sensemak-
ing tasks because academics first, explicitly or implicitly,
need to make sense of the structure of the academic domains
under investigation in order to complete the tasks (Pontis &
Blandford, in press).
Scientific community organizational structures. Whitley
(2000) and Becher and Trowler (2001) present organiza-
tional features of different scientific fields (e.g., HCI and
chemistry), providing a clear view of their structure and key
components. Whitley (2000) describes scientific fields as
organizations that control knowledge production and knowl-
edge evaluation, which deal with high degrees of (technical
and strategic) task uncertainty. The internal structure of a
scientific field includes components and relationships.
Research sites and groups, specialisms, schools of practice,
tasks, processes of coordination, conflicts, members, and
roles are some of those components. Knowing the structure
of a community helps understand the interdependencies and
relationships between the different components (Whitley,
2000). With the influence tasks of our study we explored
strategic task uncertainty by asking participants to gain an
understanding of the structure of both a familiar and an
unfamiliar scientific field. We refer to this type of task as
structure tasks because they explore the internal structure of
an organization, in contrast to narrative tasks, in which they
explore the reconstruction of a story (e.g., chain of events).
Study
This study tested the D/F model (Klein et al., 2007) to
gain an understanding of academics’ sensemaking processes
and analysis activities when working on structure tasks
focused on the problem of “influence.” Academics (of dif-
ferent levels of seniority) were asked to understand and
define familiar and unfamiliar domains in terms of current
and future influential community members. This study
addressed (a) how academics construct knowledge of their
community through building an understanding of the
concept of influence (being influential and becoming influ-
ential), (b) what sensemaking activities academics under-
take while making sense of a community that they are
already intimately familiar with and one that they are out-
siders to, and (c) which sensemaking activities of the D/F
model are manifested in their sensemaking journeys and
which ones are not apparent. This analysis is based on the
same data set as that reported by Pontis and Blandford (in
press); in that paper, the focus is on how novices and experts
respond to tasks within and outside their areas of expertise,
and how they use internal and external knowledge sources,
whereas in this paper the focus is on the applicability of the
D/F model to this kind of sensemaking task. For complete-
ness, we include details of the data gathering method here,
although it is only the analysis that differs between the two
papers.
Methods
We designed an experimental study with academics from
the HCI domain to investigate how they made sense of
structure sensemaking tasks. A think-aloud session (Erics-
son & Simon, 1984) followed by a debriefing semistructured
interview was conducted with each participant at University
College London (UCL) labs. The shortest think-aloud
session lasted 50 minutes, and the longest was 1 hour and 30
minutes. Participants were given four tasks to complete
using both traditional tools (e.g., paper, pencil, post-its, etc.)
and a computer with full Internet access. We did not specify
particular search software or tools to be used during the
session. Both think-aloud sessions and interviews were
audiorecorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis, and
participants’ interactions with the computer were recorded
using screen capture software.
Participants
We recruited 11 participants from UCL. Six participants
were students from the master of science in human computer
interaction (HCI) course with 1 to 5 years of research
experience, which we refer to here as professional expertise.
They have basic HCI knowledge and no chemistry
knowledge at all. We refer to subject matter knowledge
as domain expertise. The remaining five participants
were members of the staff at the UCL Interaction Centre
(UCLIC) with more than 10 years of research experience
and more than 5 years actively working in HCI. Dorst (2004)
and Kennedy (1987) stress that after 5 years of actively
working in a specific domain, people develop a repertoire of
experiences to handle problems without supervision, and
therefore can be considered experienced. Consequently, in
this paper we refer to participants with little professional and
domain expertise as novices, and those with more than 5
years of experience in both types of expertise as experts.
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Participants’ demographic information has been anony-
mized and coded with a combination of letters and numbers
summarized in Table 2.
To increase validity and objectivity, none of the partici-
pants in the study was familiar with the tasks in advance or
had a previous personal relationship with the researcher.
Study Structure
The study was organized in three parts (Figure 2). Before
the beginning of the session we gave participants a short
questionnaire to gather demographic information; we asked
about their research experience (professional expertise) and
background domain knowledge (domain expertise). Then
we gave participants an anagram as a warm-up task (Erics-
son & Simon, 1984, pp. 376–378) to help them practice
verbalizing what was going on in their minds (see Appen-
dix A1). We gave participants two words (one at a time)
from which they had to rearrange the letters to come up with
an English word while thinking aloud. After this, we gave
participants four influence tasks (see Appendix A2) aimed at
exploring one familiar (HCI) and one unfamiliar domain
(chemistry). We selected HCI and chemistry as the two
domains of the study because participants were unlikely to
have any experience in the latter, and both domains are
different from each other in that chemistry is a much larger
and consolidated domain, and HCI is a smaller research
specialty. This contrast of domains was found useful to
challenge participants throughout the tasks and gather rich
experiences.
For all tasks, participants had to construct an understand-
ing of the concepts of “being influential” and “becoming
influential”; we did not provide definitions of the terms
during the study. Although at the beginning of the session we
stressed that there were “no right or wrong answers” to each
participant, to achieve full completion of each task they
needed to provide the names of three influential academics.
Tasks 1 and 3 were referred to as identification tasks because
participants were asked to identify current influential candi-
dates, and Tasks 2 and 4 were referred to as prediction tasks,
as participants were asked to identify who might be future
influential candidates. For Tasks 1 and 2 participants made
sense of the HCI domain, and for Tasks 3 and 4 they did so
of the chemistry domain.
Following the D/F model, we gave tasks in the same
order to help participants first make sense of the bigger
picture (elaborating) before dealing with the search for more
specific types of information (inferring) (Klein et al., 2007).
HCI tasks were given first, helping participants concentrate
on the search for the requested information, get used to
thinking aloud, and be at ease with the task type of the study.
Tasks were provided to participants one at a time. Only
when the current task was completed did we give the next
task. This way, we allowed participants to get immersed in
each task. When a participant was feeling blocked with the
current task, they moved forward to the next task. Some
participants returned to complete earlier tasks after doing
later tasks, and some of them revised their responses at the
end of the session.
The last part of the study involved a semistructured
debriefing interview with each participant. Debriefing inter-
views provided further details, which enriched notes and
expanded observations made during the sessions (Charters,
2003). In addition, participants gave richer descriptions of
unclear parts, silences, and other relevant aspects of their
thinking processes. We used these data to validate interpre-
tations during the analysis of the transcripts.
Data Analysis
We collected 44 tasks, which varied in length, in number
and type of sensemaking activities, in ways of interacting
with the computer, and in ways of solving the tasks, but
provided a rich description of participants’ sensemaking
processes and activities. Transcripts from tasks were ini-
tially analyzed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke,
2006), and a second layer of analysis was conducted apply-
ing the D/F model to guide the analysis. The results of the
TABLE 2. Participants’ demographic information.
Code Gender Age
Professional
expertise Domain expertise
E1 Male 30–39 years old 10–20 years More than 5 years
in HCIFemales 30–39 years old
E2 30–39 years old
E3 30–39 years old
E4 30–39 years old
E5
N1 20–29 years old 1–5 years 1–5 years in HCI
N2 40–49 years old
N3 20–29 years old
N4 20–29 years old
N5 20–29 years old
N6 20–29 years old
FIG. 2. Study structure.
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thematic analysis are presented by Pontis and Blandford (in
press), and the focus of the present paper is on the latter
layer of analysis; however, reference to findings from the
initial analysis is also made and indicated when necessary.
In this paper, we report on factors that will help support
sensemaking of structure tasks: which D/F sensemaking
activities were manifested in the process of making sense of
such tasks, the sequence of those activities, and how partici-
pants constructed their initial frames. For that, we selected
four tasks from two novices (N4 and N6) and two experts
(E2 and E3) that we considered richer and representative of
each group of expertise. This decision was made based on
our knowledge gained from the thematic analysis: We
selected tasks that (a) took average time for completion,
discarding shortest and longest tasks, with (b) different
levels of completion (tasks with two or three names identi-
fied, and tasks with no identified names at all), and with (c)
the use of soft and hard evidence to make sense of the tasks.
Then we manually coded the selected 16 tasks following
Klein et al.’s (2007) sensemaking activities and terminol-
ogy. We stopped in-depth analysis after 16 tasks because no
new information was revealed in the analysis of task 13
onwards, and the preceding thematic analysis had not high-
lighted any properties of other task transcripts that would
make them particular candidates for additional in-depth
analysis. Consequently, we concluded that theoretical satu-
ration had been reached by this point.
The analysis involved activity categorization, semantic
analysis, and mapping. First, we agreed with another
researcher how to categorize participants’ sensemaking pro-
cesses into activities using the D/F as a framework
(Figure 1), making sure that we both were interpreting and
applying the framework in the same way. We coded tran-
scripts and screen capture videos independently using five
variables: user’s expertise, data set, action type, influence
indicator, and sensemaking activity. In the analysis, we used
11 sensemaking activities: nine activities described by Klein
et al. (2007), and two emerging activities not contemplated
in the theory. Each researcher created analysis logs with the
coded data (Table 3) that we then compared; resolving any
semantic discrepancies until we reached consensus and
interrater agreement.
Then we conducted a semantic analysis coding partici-
pants’ understanding of influence. Transcripts were seman-
tically coded as follows: each time participants provided an
indication of what influence would mean by them or of
trying to make sense of any of the above concepts we high-
lighted those words. For example, participant N6’s descrip-
tion when she found an article provided initial indications of
what influence meant for her:
There is actually an article for children about famous scientists,
and I’m going to look at that, because it probably gives some of
the basic people, important people there [Chemistry domain].
We inferred that for N6 an influence candidate needed to
be famous and needed to be a chemist. In addition, for this TA
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participant being famous was understood as being impor-
tant. We referred to these qualities as influence indicators.
From this analysis, influence indicator types for identifying
and predicting influential community members emerged, as
summarized in Figure 3. Influence indicators were consid-
ered the main data components of participants’ explanatory
structures or frames.
The last step was mapping participants’ sensemaking
journeys using the D/F model terminology. We mapped
performed activities horizontally from left to right as
chains to indicate related activities. We used a box to rep-
resent each sensemaking activity, and arrows to indicate
how they were connected to each other and ordered
(Figures 6 and 7). Black arrows indicate that a piece of
information was found useful and triggered further activi-
ties, and gray arrows indicate that participants went back
to a previous state of the process, often discarding the
information found. Pontis and Blandford (in press)
describe these moments as “turning points” in the sense-
making process. Chains were also numbered and organized
vertically from top to bottom to reconstruct the sensemak-
ing structure of each task. Below we explain the coding
rationale.
We began the coding when participants were reading the
task aloud and expressing an understanding of what they
were asked to do. This activity was mapped as “recognize
the situation” (Figure 4A), followed by the box “construct-
ing the frame” (Figure 4B) representing the moment of real-
ization of how much participants already knew about each
task.
Figure 5 represents a sensemaking chain from N6’s
journey for Task 3 and it reads as follows:
FIG. 3. Participants’ influence indicators used per task. The type of indicators are: (1) Professional expertise, (2) Domain expertise, (3) Education, (4) The
community, and (5) Personal contact. Participants analyzed in detail using the D/F Model (E2, E3, N4, and N6) are highlighted with a gray background.
FIG. 4. Initial activities performed by participant E2.
8 JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—•• 2015
DOI: 10.1002/asi
• Black solid stroke boxes indicate elaboration activities, such
as “seek and infer data” (5a), “add and fill slots” (5b), and
“discard data” (5d).
• Light gray boxes indicate incoming information referred to as
“data points” (5c), building on Moore and Hoffman’s (2011)
work. In this analysis, we considered two types of “data
points”: information found and used to identify a candidate
influencer, and information found to expand participants’
initial frame (i.e., identify new influence indicators).
• Dashed stroke boxes indicate questioning activities, such as
“gauge data quality” (5e), “judge plausibility” (5f), and
“detect inconsistencies” (5g).
• Darker gray solid boxes indicate choices of preselected can-
didates and final decisions (5h). These last two sensemaking
activities are not originally considered in the D/F model.
Finally, we triangulated sensemaking transcripts with
screen captures and participants’ debriefing interview tran-
scripts to determine when participants started a search to
find information that may lead them to a candidate influ-
encer (e.g., open browser), what type of keywords or terms
they selected (e.g., keywords: influential chemists), and
when they changed the initial seeking strategy (e.g., selected
a new term/s or keyword such as Marie Curie). We also paid
attention to and coded explicit actions (typically interactions
with the computer), and observable actions (e.g., thinking,
reading, explaining) to gather insights into the type of
actions involved in each sensemaking activity.
Results
In this analysis, we explored how participants made sense
of influence tasks and whether the D/F model sensemaking
activities were manifested in the academic domain structure
context. Overall, although participants performed most of
the sensemaking activities, excluding the activities of
“seeking and inferring new relationships,” “tracking anoma-
lies,” and “seeking a new frame,” some additional activities
were manifested as well. In addition, we elaborate on how a
domain is organized, what it is to be influential, and what it
is to become influential: concepts that emerged from the
analysis. In this paper, we present the sensemaking journeys
of four participants (N4, N6, E2, and E3); we include as
examples the journey maps for Task 3 of two of those par-
ticipants (N6 and E2; Figures 6 and 7, respectively). These
are representative of the processes of novices and experts
across the four tasks of the study. When experiences from
the remaining seven participants are used to complement
and expand findings, this is clearly indicated.
Narrative Versus Structure Sensemaking Tasks
In narrative sensemaking tasks one piece of new knowl-
edge helps understand the story and individuals can build on
it to construct further understanding. In structure tasks, the
process varies, as Figures 6 and 7 show. Participants could
not follow a thread or construct a narrative because there
was no story to learn or reconstruct. The aim of these tasks
was to find a concrete piece of information (three influence
candidates), which is a very different aim from gaining an
understanding of how a series of events happened, as in
narrative tasks.
The influence tasks of this study involved unraveling the
structure of the HCI and chemistry domains, after having
identified some parameters to distinguish what was relevant
from irrelevant (indicators), key domain components
(members, literature, sources), but also how to relate them
(interdependencies and relationships), and assess their level
of relevance (which components are more important). The
sensemaking maps shown in Figures 6 and 7 indicate differ-
ent journeys between novices and experts. Pontis and Bland-
ford (in press) report differences between the sensemaking
processes of both, mainly in terms of level of engagement,
and the ways they made final decisions (arbitrary vs.
informed decisions). Further differences emerged from this
FIG. 5. N6’s chain of sensemaking activities.
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analysis, as illustrated in the above figures and discussed
below.
For tasks concerning participants’ own field of expertise,
the main difference was that experienced participants relied
mostly on their previous knowledge to complete the tasks
(soft evidence), while novices’ sensemaking processes were
typically longer because they needed to find hard evidence
on which to base their decisions (Pontis & Blandford, in
press). Findings of novices and experts indicate different
sensemaking processes, as discussed below.
The process of N6 is simpler, with six data points, than
that of E2, with 15 data points. In addition, E2’s process is
more elaborated, in that she judged the plausibility of data
points, discarded those she found irrelevant, and dug deeper
into data points she found relevant (e.g., Data points 14 and
15). The higher number of data points discarded also shows
a lack of conviction from the information found. As a result,
E2 needed more convincing information before even prese-
lecting a candidate, while N6 preselected six names from six
data points.
Moreover, as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, novice par-
ticipants made sense and made decisions in shorter journeys
than experts, or they needed less exploration in order to
make a decision. Experts frequently explored a data point,
FIG. 6. Participant N6’s sensemaking process of Task 3 applying the D/F theory.
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FIG. 7. Participant E2’s sensemaking process of Task 3 applying the D/F theory.
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performing various activities before discarding it, and
tended to elaborate the initial frame further, searching for
additional information to fill knowledge slots or verify their
initial hunches or ideas. They also expressed high degrees of
concern when they could not trust a source, and questioned
its origin. In addition, experts evaluated incoming informa-
tion in terms of their understanding and whether they could
judge the relevance of that information based on their back-
ground knowledge.
We also found similarities between novices and experts.
When both came across a name repeatedly (e.g., Marie
Curie and John Dalton, in the cases of N6 and E2, respec-
tively), they sought further information before making a
final decision. In some cases, such as E3, participants
gauged the quality and relevance of the information found in
the searches. The sensemaking journeys showed a high
number of turning points and discarded data points, indicat-
ing the lack of a narrative flow.
As previously reported (Pontis & Blandford, in press), in
all 44 tasks we found that participants only worked with one
frame. This characteristic points out a difference from nar-
rative sensemaking in which sensemakers frequently track
two or three alternative frames simultaneously until they
choose one as the most relevant (Klein et al., 2007). Hence,
instead of frames, we referred to the identification of candi-
dates as frame instantiations, building on Russell et al.
(1993), because participants kept or expanded the initial
explanatory structure. In the following sections we discuss
frame instantiations in more detail, analyze the main sense-
making activities manifested in the processes, and indicate
those which emerged from this study but that were not
originally taken into account by the D/F model.
Recognizing and Constructing the Frame
Understanding influence concepts. In different ways, at the
beginning of each task, the four participants first recognized
the situation and what they were asked for. To recognize the
problem, they read aloud the task brief, and assessed
whether their background knowledge could be of any help or
was related to the problem domain. Figure 8 illustrates the
thought of participant N6 at the beginning of Task 3.
After that, participants started to construct an understand-
ing of what “being influential” meant. For later tasks, in
most cases, participants expanded or adapted their previous
understanding of “influence” to the task requirements (e.g.,
prediction instead of identification). In terms of the D/F
model, this initial understanding acted as the explanatory
structure (frame) that defined what information participants
needed to seek, and whether and how their previous experi-
ences could be utilized to solve the current task. In Klein
et al.’s (2007) terms, participants’ initial understanding was
used to develop the initial frame.
Initially, we designed the task as focused on understand-
ing the concept of “being influential”; however, two other
concepts emerged from the analysis. As Figure 8 shows,
participant N6 begins Task 3 by trying to make sense of
“chemistry.” To operationalize an academic domain, first it
is necessary to narrow it down by identifying and learning its
structuring components (e.g., members, subdomains, trends,
authoritative sources) (Pontis & Blandford, in press). As
participants were unfamiliar with Tasks 3 and 4 domain,
they first needed to understand the concept of “chemistry” in
order then to make sense of the problem of influence:
With task 1 [HCI domain], I was able to think HCI and then
sub-theme games and then try to search more specifically, but
with this task, there’s just the general heading of chemistry, so
it’s quite difficult to know which sub-category of chemistry I
should actually be looking in.—[Task 3—E3]
It’s such a big area. I don’t know how to narrow it down and I
don’t . . . even looking at these journals, kind of, going, okay, so
those are the impact factors; great. Who’s published in those,
and then I’m trying to look at that and cross-reference it with the
students and not finding much, or finding one, but okay, if they
each have a publication, who’s the most influential?—[About
Tasks 3 and 4—E2]
Because [HCI] was my field I knew the associations that are
well-respected. But with chemistry I don’t know the important
bodies of . . . the important chemistry organisations.—[About
Tasks 3 and 4—N4]
In line with previous work (Becher & Trowler, 2001;
Whitley, 2000), this indicated that unraveling the organiza-
tional structure was the first step for making sense of an
academic domain. By starting her search with Marie Curie,
participant N6 narrowed down the chemistry domain to a
member component.
A third concept emerged that participants had to make
sense of which was related to Tasks 2 and 4. Indicators used
for those tasks, for example, age, indicated the use of dif-
ferent criteria to make sense of the problem of “becoming
influential.” The difference between the concepts of “being
FIG. 8. N6’s thoughts at the beginning of Task 3.
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influential” (identifying) and “becoming influential” (pre-
dicting) is elaborated further in the next section.
Defining influence indicators. Each participant used a set
of indicators to define the meaning of influence, which were
the data components of the frame acting as anchors points
(Klein et al., 2007). Klein et al. (2007, pp. 122–123) stated
that the first “one or two key data elements we experience
sometimes serve as anchors for creating an understanding.
These anchors elicit the initial frame, and we use that frame
to search for more data elements.” In the study, participants
determined and used indicators to construct the explanatory
structure to direct their search processes. Indicators helped
them decide what keywords and search strategies were the
appropriate ones to find candidates. When initial indicators
were not rich enough to help participants begin a search and
connect data with the frame, participants revised their initial
idea of what it meant to be an influencer, and determined
more indicators.
Participants made sense of the problem of influence by
operationalizing two different concepts: what they thought a
current thought leader was (being influential) and what a
future “rising star” should be (becoming influential), and by
defining what characteristics they should have (indicators).
They described an influential candidate as someone who
has: some sort of recognition (e.g., peer recognition through
citation count, prizes awarded), made contributions to
knowledge or big developments, influenced and enlightened
others’ way of thinking or works, and has had an active
presence in his/her area of expertise, produced a consistent
amount of work, and planted the seed for something (e.g.,
started producing something) or was the founder of, for
example, a course, a discipline. A future influential candi-
date was thought to: be of a young age, be investigating/
working on new/emerging areas as opposed to more
traditional areas, be producing work with potential/
promising future application, be at an early stage in the field,
be related to (e.g., working or studying with) already influ-
ential people, have a varied range of contacts and network-
ing skills, and belong to a prestigious institution (e.g.,
university, Royal Society, research group, company).
The above characteristics can be grouped into five
types of indicators for identifying and predicting influential
candidates that participants considered for solving the tasks:
1. Candidate’s professional expertise: Intrinsic characteris-
tics of academia, from having a record of publications and
citation counts to attending top conferences and belong-
ing to a research group.
2. Candidate’s domain expertise: Aspects directly related
to a domain, from belonging to the domain and having
done some sort of work related to it to having done
seminal work or be doing something to contribute to its
development.
3. Candidate’s education: Universities and research centers
which the candidate has attended and been awarded
degrees from, and also candidate’s year of graduation and
age.
4. Candidate’s research community: Other researchers’
thoughts and opinions, and whether the community has
somehow recognized candidates’ work by awarding
prizes or deeming them as influential, respectable, or
up-and-coming.
5. Candidate’s personal relationship with the partici-
pant: Whether the sensemaker knows a candidate, has
worked with them, or has heard of them in class or during
a conference; and whether that person has influenced their
own work.
Figure 3 summarizes the five indicator types described
above, and indicates which specific indicators were used for
each task by each of the 11 participants. All participants used
four or five indicator types to identify and predict candi-
dates. In line with Whitley’s (2000) theory, candidates’ pro-
fessional expertise was the type of indicator most used by
participants to assess their degree of influence, followed by
candidates’ domain expertise. Having had some sort of
contact either at work or having heard of a candidate in
class, and candidates’ education background were consid-
ered more reliable aspects to measure influence than com-
munity recognition of their works by awards or appraisals.
The last indicator type was mostly used for tasks in which
participants were familiar with the domain and have had
more direct contact with their peers.
A learning curve emerged throughout the four tasks.
When participants arrived at the last tasks they had already
constructed an understanding of influence, and they just
expanded that frame with the particularities of the last tasks.
For example, for Task 1, participants E2 and N6 considered
someone influential when they “have done seminal work,”
and for Task 2, a future influential academic when they
would “be doing interesting stuff in the area” or “exciting
work.” Then, participants E2, E3, N4, and N6 determined as
an influence indicator “to belong to the HCI domain” for
Task 1, and they used that same indicator for Task 3, but
rephrased as “to be a chemist.” Participant E3 explained how
Task 1 experience helped her for addressing Task 3:
I kind of had more of an idea of where to go for Task 1. With
Task 3, because it’s a completely different domain, I was more
lost in terms of where to start, but because I had done Task 1, I
tried to apply some of the same things to Task 3. So in particu-
lar, I was thinking about . . . before, I was doing influential in
terms of publications, so who’s published a lot. Also, with Task
1, the people identified, they’ve been involved in conferences
and journal papers. One of the people in Task 3, there was
someone that was an editor for a journal, so that was a kind of
a similar strategy there as well. I think the main difficulty was
because I didn’t know the sub-domain, I didn’t know where to
specialize in chemistry.—[E3]
Prediction tasks demanded more indicators than identi-
fying tasks. Participants also determined different indicators
within each type related to selecting future influential peers
and not established ones. In particular, this situation
occurred mainly during Task 2. For example, participants E1
and E2 paid attention to the dates of published work for
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solving that task, making sure that they were choosing can-
didates who they knew had published recently, and therefore
indicated they were active researchers.
Participants combined indicators to construct their
frames. The D/F model describes the construction of frames
and the search for data as actions happening simultaneously
(chicken/egg relationship; Moore & Hoffman, 2011).
However, we observed the recognition of a frame and con-
struction of that structure occurring first, and being neces-
sary to start a productive search. This is shown in Figures 6
and 7 in which the first action participants performed was to
recognize the problem followed by starting to construct the
frame.
Connecting data with the frame through indicators. After
gaining an understanding of “influence” and defining indi-
cators, participants adopted searching strategies to find data
responding to those indicators in order to connect them with
the frame. For each type of task, participants sought people
with a combination of 2 to 12 of the indicators shown in
Figure 3. This highlighted that indicators were essential to
start connecting data with the frame, as participants used
them as a way to assess and measure a candidate’s influence.
Participants reported that the lack of a set of indicators to
determine degrees of influence was one of the main reasons
why they found prediction tasks (2 and 4) as “second-
guessing the future” (E4).
By searching data, participants enriched and expanded
the initial explanatory structure, until they found community
members who could be considered influential. In other
words, they were elaborating the frame, but also identifying
instantiations of that frame. In the next section we discuss
this concept.
Finding Instantiations: Elaborating the Frame and
Identifying Candidates
The D/F model states that sensemakers elaborate the
initial frame until they find a relevant explanation that fits
that structure. However, we observed that because of the
nature of the tasks, there was more than one possible expla-
nation to the task frame. This is in line with the work of
Russell et al. (1993): Participants identified information of
interest to select an influence candidate which was a repre-
sentation or example of the explanatory structure. In some
cases, participants stopped pursing those instantiations and
considered them final candidates after a short pause for
reflection. This situation is exemplified with Chain 16: John
Dalton from E2 in Figure 7. In other cases, participants
decided not to preserve a found instantiation because they
were not convinced enough that it was addressing all indi-
cators, and opted to seek a new candidate (e.g., Chain 5:
Louis Pasteur—N6, Figure 6). When this occurred, some
participants decided to elaborate the frame further by
identifying more indicators that may help them find more
suitable candidates (e.g., Chain 4a and 4b: Candidate’s
research—N6, Figure 6), while other participants kept the
frame as it initially was and used it to identify the remaining
candidates (e.g., N4 and N3).
The D/F model states that data components used as
anchors for one frame should not be used as such in a second
frame to avoid conceptual strain. This is in line with the
analysis presented here: Participants worked with only one
frame across the four tasks because they worked with or
recombined the same anchors throughout the sensemaking
process of the four tasks.
Once participants were able to connect data and frame,
they started elaborating that frame until they found a candi-
date (instantiation). In line with the D/F model, participants
expanded the frame by seeking and inferring data. Partici-
pants performed this sensemaking activity on many occa-
sions, from trying to define a search strategy or find a new
strategy, to looking for a specific source of information.
Occasionally, they filled slots from the initial frame when
they discovered new relevant information, which strength-
ened their understanding of someone they were considering
a candidate influencer. However, they discarded a piece of
information when it was considered irrelevant (E2, E3),
time-consuming to investigate further (N4), or when partici-
pants could not assess the relevance (E2, E3).
Questioning Instantiations: Source Origin and Credibility
As previously discussed, some participants asked them-
selves many questions after identifying a potential influence
candidate (instantiation) and judged the plausibility of their
selected candidates (instantiations); other participants ques-
tioned the candidate’s expertise and magnitude of their
achievements, while other participants were more concerned
about the information source from which the candidate
name was found. In this latter case, participants E2 and E3
questioned the plausibility, origin, and credibility of the
sources. When the source of information could not be
trusted, participants gauged the quality of the data. This was
a frequent occurrence among more experienced study par-
ticipants who sought additional sources of information as
evidence to support potential candidates when they did not
fully trust the initial source. This is shown in Figure 6 with
“Judge plausibility” boxes.
A prior study (Pontis & Blandford, in press) found that
experts relied on their background knowledge when possible
to assess a candidate’s record of influence contributions and
thus support the influence status. This second layer of analy-
sis shows that some participants also gauged the relevance of
the information found against the influence indicators and
their prior knowledge. In addition, experts who were highly
engaged with the tasks connected the incoming information
to previous experiences or knowledge:
I’m curious about one of the answers here, because years ago, I
read a book on philosophy; it was a book called Sophie’s World,
and they talked a bit about the Ancient Greeks and their influ-
ence in philosophy and science and all that, kind of, thing, and
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there is a guy called Democritus, and I’m pretty sure he had
some interesting ideas about particles and things like that. Want
to find out a little bit more about him to try and remind myself,
but these are the foundations, I guess.—[Task 3—E2]
E2 and E3 expressed frustration when they could not
understand the magnitude of a candidate’s discovery or con-
tribution, because of the lack of the necessary domain exper-
tise. In the cases of N4 and N6, they primarily judged the
plausibility of frame instantiations, rather than the origin or
credibility of a data point.
Reframing Instantiations and Choosing Final Candidates
The nature of the sensemaking tasks of this study did not
require participants to construct a story or a narrative to
make sense of the problem. This meant that participants
worked with only one frame (although they made sense of
three concepts), in contrast to narrative sensemaking tasks,
in which sensemakers compare up to three frames (explana-
tions) (Klein et al., 2007; Moore & Hoffman, 2011). None of
the participants reframed the initial explanatory structure
(frame) and constructed a new one; instead, they expanded
the same structure throughout the four tasks by adding or
adapting influence indicators (anchors) (Figure 3). That is,
instead of working with more than one frame, participants
worked with more than one frame instantiation (candidate
name).
Participants selected between three and eight possible
candidates for each task, although most selected the
requested three only. Participants searched for one candidate
at a time, and only in a few cases did participants compare
the instantiations in order to make a final decision. We
observed this mainly for Tasks 3 and 4 when participants
preselected a higher numbers of candidates. Lack of confi-
dence in making final decisions is a consequence of partici-
pants lacking the necessary knowledge to assess the
relevance of incoming information (E2 and E3) (Pontis &
Blandford, in press). In the cases of N4 and N6, they pursued
candidates they considered could be influential until they
discovered some information that made them change their
mind and discard their current candidate.
A Data/Frame Model for Influence Structure Tasks
In the above sections we discussed the sensemaking cog-
nitive activities that emerged from our study. Now we
present those activities using the D/F model introduced in
Figure 1 as a structure, but building on it to represent struc-
ture sensemaking. As Figure 9 illustrates, we introduce two
modifications to the original model: consideration of frame
instantiations and expansion of the number of cycles from
three to five.
The first modification to the model is the focus of sense-
making activities and cycles on frame instantiations (in this
case, influencer candidates) rather than on frames. As
explained above, the fact that participants worked with only
one frame may indicate a significant difference from narra-
tive sensemaking in which sensemakers tend to contemplate
more than one frame. The current D/F model does not
provide a way to represent the elaboration of instantiations,
which may be a distinctive characteristic of structure sense-
making. Therefore, we rephrased the activity headings to
stress this point by including the word “instantiation”
(Figure 9).
Then, to the initial cycles of preservation, elaboration,
and reframing, we added the cycles of analysis and decision-
making. To avoid visual clutter in Figure 10, we excluded
arrow edges in the circles representing these two cycles, but
both are influenced by activities from other cycles, and
explained in detail as follows.
FIG. 9. Proposed D/F Model for structure sensemaking.
FIG. 10. Analysis cycle of the proposed D/F Model for structure
sensemaking.
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The analysis cycle involves the discovery of information
responding to influence indicators and the understanding of
the problem situation (Figure 10). This cycle is closely
related to seeking, inferring, adding, and discarding activi-
ties, but the focus is on how sensemakers interact with and
analyze the incoming information (data points) in terms of
its correspondence with the initial explanatory structure and
anchors (indicators). In this cycle the sensemaker identifies
the appropriate nuggets of information that are directly
related to the particular task and those which are less con-
nected but help construct the bigger picture (Qu & Furnas,
2008).
The decision-making cycle involves activities related to
making some sort of frame instantiation choice, preselecting
frame instantiations, and making a final judgment about a
frame instantiation (Figure 11). This last activity also indi-
cates the end of the sensemaking journey and, in some cases,
the completion of a task, while the previous activities indi-
cate progress in the process. The D/F model represents a
process with “no box that says ‘start here,’ ” as Moore and
Hoffman (2011) pointed out, nor box that says “end here.”
However, we found that both “boxes” were necessary to
accurately represent the full sensemaking journey of struc-
ture tasks. As Figures 6 and 7 show, the recognition of the
situation and construction of an initial explanatory structure
constituted the starting point, and the end point was clearly
indicated by all participants either when they found all three
requested candidates or when they decided to abandon a
task.
Discussion
The tasks used in this study dealt with the problem of
influence in two particular domains for which various
answers were appropriate. Participants made sense of a
problem which presented a high degree of uncertainty for
many of them, by understanding who and what were more
influential than others. Using indicators as anchors, partici-
pants assessed knowledge production, and validated the rel-
evance of contributions, some of which were completely
foreign to them. By doing this, they were constructing an
understanding of relationships among people, and unravel-
ing the organizational structure of the domains, which
allowed them to identify the requested influential candidates
for most of the tasks.
Understanding Structure Sensemaking
The sensemaking process of structure tasks is not linear.
Participants made sense of the tasks through an iterative
process of elaborating one frame, and questioning incoming
information and instantiations (Figures 6 and 7). Building
on data points was sometimes impossible or extremely hard,
resulting in journeys with many turning points. In most
cases, to identify an instantiation (candidate), participants
had to go back to the beginning of the process (connect data
with frame) and start a new search (seek and infer data),
until they found a piece of information or source (data point)
that was considered relevant.
Novice and expert sensemaking for this type of task pre-
sented both differences and commonalities. Experts went
through more elaborate sensemaking journeys, in some
cases performing a higher number of activities and turning
points, which made them analyze more data points. Experts
judged the quality and relevance of both incoming informa-
tion and preselected instantiations. On the other hand, most
novices preselected a higher number of instantiations that
were later compared in order to make the final decisions.
Most tasks solved by novices were completed with surface
exploration, which translated into fewer returns to previous
states (turning points), and in many cases, the absence of
questioning activities. Both novices and experts based their
decisions on the same influence indicator types (Figure 3),
determined similar indicators, and considered cues (e.g.,
names) that repeatedly came up in search results. In general,
both tended to use a similar number of indicators across the
four tasks, although a few novices made decisions based on
simpler frames constructed with fewer indicators.
The structure sensemaking tasks demanded different cog-
nitive activities and levels of expertise. Identification Tasks 1
and 3 were less demanding in terms of professional expertise
than predicting Tasks 2 and 4. Expanding that finding, we
also observed that Tasks 2 and 4 demanded more cognitive
activities, which resulted in more complex sensemaking
journeys. In addition, these tasks demanded a higher number
of indicators, in some cases, different or complementary to
the ones for Tasks 1 and 3 (Figure 3).
Applying the D/F Model to Structure Sensemaking
The identification and selection of frames is a conscious
process, which depends on the data and information that are
available, and on the individual’s aims, repertoire of frames,
FIG. 11. Decision-making cycle of the proposed D/F Model for structure
sensemaking.
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and attitude (e.g., commitment to a task). We described how
participants constructed an initial explanatory structure
(frame) based on their initial understanding of influence and
combining indicators. Then we discussed how that structure
evolved and, in some cases, expanded as new information
was found and participants’ learning about the concept
increased. The initial frame was actively enriched as partici-
pants identified new influence indicators (anchors). In some
cases, participants experienced a learning curve from the
first task to the last one, indicated by the fact that they used
previously identified anchors as the starting point for later
tasks.
In some cases, it was hard to clearly decompose partici-
pants’ sensemaking processes into the D/F model activities,
because frequently more than two activities occurred simul-
taneously. We found activities in line with the model and
others not originally contemplated: judging and gauging
data relevance, analyzing data, and making decisions. By
presenting sensemaking activities as chains, we stressed the
need for considering initial and end points in the process.
Building an understanding which leads to the construction
of an explanatory structure emerged as an essential initial
activity or starting point for making sense of a structure task.
Participants used that understanding to select from their
memories or find the most suitable frame to direct their
sensemaking processes and start connecting incoming data.
In Klein et al.’s (2007) model, sensemaking activities do
not have a specific order, which indicates that the process of
sensemaking can begin with any of the activities. Neverthe-
less, the fact that participants could not start the process until
they managed to construct an explanatory structure high-
lights that a certain order may be implied for some types of
sensemaking activities. Similarly, Moore and Hoffman
(2011) indicated the need of an “exit point” in the model,
which in our case is when a task is completed or abandoned.
We highlight this need by adding a cycle referring to making
choices and final decisions (Figure 11). In addition, we high-
light the need for a frame activity to code participants’ steps
related to making sense of and understanding the task itself,
referred to as “recognize a situation.”
Conclusions
This study explored structure sensemaking by applying
the D/F model to the analysis of influence tasks. As the study
reported here was conducted in experimental settings with
tasks specifically designed to explore structure sensemak-
ing, it is not possible to assess how the findings generalize to
other structure sensemaking tasks. Although the tasks inves-
tigated in this study are common in various academic con-
texts, we cannot be sure how widely the findings generalize.
Notwithstanding, as explained by Whitley (2000), all sci-
entific fields deal with a certain degree of task uncertainty as
exemplified by the ones in this study. In particular, this study
explored strategic task uncertainty; that is, the uncertainty of
the hierarchy/internal structure within a scientific field. In
general, broadening the understanding of scientific field
structures contributes to the understanding of the social
organization of the sciences; and, in particular, the problem
of influence sheds light on other intrinsic aspect of sciences:
how scientists validate knowledge, and how the different
components of a scientific field related to and depend on
each other. To solve the problem of influence (within a
familiar and an unfamiliar domain) participants needed to
unravel the hierarchy of the fields under investigation, and
determine criteria to assess the validity of the information
they encountered (e.g., whose researchers were the most
prestigious, which trends were more likely to be up-and-
coming, what journals were the most important). Knowing
these criteria and the steps researchers go through to identify
the hierarchy within a field may decrease the level of social
or strategic task uncertainty in scientific fields.
The D/F model provided a framework to make the
process of learning the internal structure of a scientific field
more tangible and understandable, in that key activities,
steps, and components involved in that process were identi-
fied. The development of the extended model provided a
possible framework for structure sensemaking in the modern
sciences, and the identification of the necessary repertoire of
search skills for dealing with strategic task uncertainty.
Further studies are needed to validate the extended model;
for example, applying the model to a broader range of struc-
ture sensemaking tasks and with a sample of researchers
from more diverse backgrounds (e.g., art and design, social
sciences, natural sciences). Nevertheless, we found that, as
well as being suitable for representing narrative sensemak-
ing, the D/F model gives a reasonably complete account of
structure sensemaking, but we also identified further activi-
ties and cycles that are needed to deliver a fuller, more
complete representation of structure sensemaking.
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Appendix A1
Warm-Up Task of the Study
Anagram
Good, “before we turn to the real experiment, we will start
with a couple of practice problems. I want you to [think
aloud] while you do these problems.” (. . .) “I would like you
to solve an anagram. I will show you a card with scrambled
letters. It is your task to find an English word that consists of
all the presented letters. For example, if the scrambled letters
are KOCO, you may see that these letters spell the word
COOK. Any questions? Now, Please talk aloud while you
solve the [following] anagram: NPEPHA” (Ericsson and
Simon, 1984, p. 376).
Appendix A2
Tasks of the Study
The tasks were as follows:
• Task 1: Please identify who are the 3 most influential
researchers/academics from your area of expertise.
• Task 2: Please identify who would be the next generation of
most influential researchers/academics from your area of exper-
tise. (3 names)
• Task 3: Please identify who are the 3 most influential
researchers/academics from the Chemistry domain.
• Task 4: Please identify who would be the next generation of
most influential researchers/academics from the Chemistry
domain. (3 names)
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